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1　Introduction
The severity and speed of the 2008 global nancial crisis have rung the bell that 
makes economists and policy makers rekindle the interest studying currency cri-
ses to find out what drive them and how to mitigate the perverse crisis impact. 
Some of empirical studies are focused to renew the existing models with hope-
fully to able to predict occurrence of crises at an earlier stage more effectively.
In the background, the study analyzes the determinants of currency crises to 
identify a set of leading indicators and develops a dynamic probit model that 
expectedly produce better predictive power of currency crises than static models 
and other approaches.
Contrary to previous empirical studies, the paper applies maximum simulated 
likelyhood (MSL) estimation for dynamic probit model with autocorrelated 
errors. The approach exploits the full information of dataset, along both cross 
country and time dimension. It means the dynamics of crises can be apprehended 
by lagged binary crisis variables that representing past policy taken by a certain 
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country. The paper also takes on a challenge of arguing some denitions and the 
measurement of currency crisis to provide some comparison of empirical models.
2　Theoretical Models of Crises
This section reviews briefly the theoretical models on currency crises with the 
aim of providing some background on how to identify a set of leading indicators 
for analysis of currency crises.
2-1　First Generation Theoretical Models
The theoretical literature on currency crises has been developed following 
Krugman＇s seminal paper of 1979 that based on the work of Salant and 
Henderson (1978). In later years, Flood and Garber (1984), Connolly and Taylor 
(1984), Calvo (1987), and Edwards (1989) have extended and simplified the 
Krugman＇s work. These models evolved in response to crises in Latin American 
countries in 1970-80s, such as Mexico (1973-1982), Argentina (1978-1981), and 
Chile (1983). The main insight of the first generation models was that crises 
arose as result of bad policies in weak economic fundamentals and rational arbi-
trage of speculators, it was not relative to market malfunctioning. In the most 
case, there were inconsistencies between xed exchange rate regime and chronic 
scal decit that forced government pursuing expansionary monetary policies. As 
the result, foreign reserves run out and led to inflation in these countries. In that 
situation, speculators anticipated the government could not keep the exchange 
rate fixed under weakness in the economy like that. They started speculative 
attacks on currency and currency crises occurred eventually.
2-2　Second Generation Theoretical Models
The key characteristics of the rst generation models failed to explain the specu-
lative attacks on the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992-93 that seemed 
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unrelated to the economic fundamentals.
After reunification, Germany implemented high interest rate policy to fight 
inflation in the early 1990s. At the same time, other European countries were 
plagued by economic stagnation, for example France and Great Britain were fac-
ing high unemployment and interest rates, but they could not follow expansionary 
monetary or scal policies with the reason they had to link their currencies to the 
Deutsuchemark through EMS. Moreover, right before the crisis, German interest 
rate was decreasing. However, the crisis erupted so abruptly and unexpectedly. 
How can it be explained? It raised a controversial theme that if the speculation is 
not determined solely by the economic fundamentals, what would other factors 
be considered of? In order to answer these questions, Obsfeld (1994, 96), Calvo 
(1995), Isard (1995), Sutherland (1995), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), Cole 
and Kehoe (1996), and Flood and Marison (1998) have developed a number of 
new models. The main explaining of these models was crises as consequence of 
self-fulfilling expectations in theoretical settings with multiple equilibria that 
were the most attention theories of the second generation models. It is not always 
like people thought as previously, ＂fundamentals＂ cause ＂market expectations＂. It 
means a weak macroeconomic condition makes people participate in bad conse-
quences that lead to crises. However, converse phenomenon might also occur, 
＂market expectations＂ make ＂fundamentals＂ change. It means market expectations 
might make fundamentals getting worsen even they are not bad as people 
thought. Ultimately, the worst consequence happens that is currency crisis. In 
fact, the causality of fundamentals and market expectations affect mutually, this 
circularity can lead to multiple equilibria. In the circular process, government 
plays a role of active agent who chooses the option that their costs are optimal in 
the view of government under the certain of economic environment. It means 
government weights the benefit and the cost of the exchange rate commitments, 
if necessary, they might devalue, revalue or even oat the exchange rate in order 
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to minimum the costs of its policy. The reason makes government do like that 
because the government is not able to afford the prohibitive costs to maintain the 
xed exchange rate. In the situation, the “fundamentals” that they consider about 
are not only ＂hard fundamentals＂ as usually thought like current account, interest 
rates variable and others, but also ＂soft fundamentals＂ such as the sentiment or 
heuristics of market participants that taken into account as important factors.1)
The disconnection between economic fundamentals and crisis timing of EMS 
crises made people think speculation in the different way. Speculation is moti-
vated not only by economic fundamentals; it is also determined by the self-ful-
lling mood of market. This provides a useful insight of the occurrence and pre-
cise timing of crises that is may be impossible to predict the timing of crises 
exactly solely on the basis of fundamentals. It is not necessary to tell that funda-
mentals plays a crucial role, because if it is not fragile or deteriorated, it would 
not make currency ripe for an attack.
2-3　Third Generation Theoretical Models
Difference from the aspects of second generation, the outburst of the Asian crisis 
in 1997-98 has prompted a number of economists to call for a third generation 
models of currency crises.
The Asian crisis seems to have differed from crises described in the previous 
models. It is harder to characterize features of the crisis simply based on existing 
models. Generally new models are therefore developed by putting the analytical 
focus on distortions in financial markets, banking systems, and the contagion of 
crises across countries. Some features of the third generation models are near to 
the second one that speculative attacks of the third generation also take into 
account multiple equilibria, but now the interaction between governments with 
 1)　See more details at Isard (1995).
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speculators is shifted to nancial intermediates with speculators. ＂Financial Lib-
eralization＂, ＂Over Borrowing Syndrome＂, ＂Implicit or Explicit Government 
Guarantees＂, ＂Moral Hazard＂, and ＂Bank Run＂ are added to the model that con-
sidered as the important features to explain currency crises.
3　Identifying a Set of Explanatory Variables
As specified in the previous section of theoretical models of crises as well as 
other empirical studies2) were validated, the objective of this section is to make 
the choice of the set of leading variables. These explanatory variables are identi-
fied here including all of the concept such as ＂Speculative Attack＂, ＂Self-Fulfill-
ing＂, ＂Multiple Equilibria＂, ＂Distortion of Financial and Banking System＂, and 
＂Contagion of Crisis＂ that are expected to reect all main potential determinants 
to force countries＇ vulnerabilities to crisis.
The first variable is the real growth rate of GDP that is crucial variable 
because government has tended to make its currency devalue when economic 
growth is low with two reasons. First, low growth economy makes government 
difficult to keep its economy to sustainable as well as it has fewer resources to 
defend itself against an attack. Second, government devalues its currency to gain 
competitiveness and boost the economy to growth again. The second variable is 
the current account as a percentage of GDP that is also a key variable for analy-
sis of currency crisis. The deterioration of this variable is considered as one of 
determinant that makes a crisis to occur. The third variable is the ratio of short 
term debt to foreign reserves. The higher short term debt, the more vulnerability 
of the economy is. The lower level of foreign reserves, the easier for speculators 
attack their currencies. The fourth variable is government budget as a fraction of 
GDP that could provide a signal based on the first generation theoretical model. 
 2)　See more details at Frankel and Rose (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
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The fth variable is the increase of the credit to private sector that is designed to 
capture weakness in financial system. The sixth variable is the extent of the real 
of exchange rate over appreciation that defined as deviation of real effective 
exchange rate from a linear trend. The seventh variable is the unemployment rate 
that is considered as political costs that might trigger a crisis. The eighth variable 
is the short term capital inflows. If a country has a large amount of short term 
capital inflows denominated in foreign currencies, the suddenly stop or reversal 
of capital flows will make a sharp devaluation. The ninth variable is the correla-
tion of equity returns between the countries that considered as herding contagion. 
The real interest rate and inflation are also added to the model as the tenth and 
eleventh variables.
4　Denition of Currency Crisis
This section discusses denitions of currency crisis and its measurement which is 
one of the most debatable issues while dealing with analyzing currency crisis.
A currency crisis is often defined as a sharp depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate. However, in the situation, a country found with a strong rise in 
interest rates or/and sudden fall in foreign reserves is also considered as a coun-
try under high pressure on speculative attacks of exchange rate. Both cases above 
are considered as successful and unsuccessful speculative attack respectively.
In the case of successful speculative attack, the devaluation rate has to be large 
enough. To measure this, the following measurement can be acceptable.
                                          δnom
qtr
it
> 15%
Where δnom
qtr
it  is one quarter change rate of the nominal exchange rate in the 
economy i at the time t. The threshold value of 15 percent is reasonable in some-
what, when comparing with other studies and in the sensitivity analysis.
However, it is also necessary to think about the depreciation of nominal 
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exchange rate in the country with high inflation that is often correspondingly 
with sharp expected rates of depreciation. In order capture a currency crisis in 
this case, the following measurement can be used.3)
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Where δrerit
4) is the two month changes of real exchange rate in the economy i 
at time t. σ δi rer  is the standard deviation of two month changes in real exchange 
rate in the economy i.
In the case of unsuccessful speculative attack, currency crises are dened as a 
large change in exchange market pressure index (EMPI). The intuition behind 
here is if there is an attack on the currency severely, government may raise inter-
est rates and/or deplete foreign reserves to defend exchange rate. Referring to this 
denition, the EMPI is constructed as following.
First, EMPI is calculated as a weighted average of the change in real exchange 
rate, in foreign reserves and in real interest rates as below:
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Where rerit  is the real exchange rate, rit  is the real interest rate (short term 
rate), resvit  is the level of foreign reserves in the economy i at the time t, ωrer , 
ωr , ωresv  are the weights each, respectively.
Second, transform EMPI into a binary variable using cut-off level 1.5 standard 
deviation.
 3)　The similar thingking also found in Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995, 1996), 
Goldfajn and Valdés (1997), and Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) to dene a 
crisis.
 4)　Capture changes in the real exchange rate that lie in the upper 0.5% of the distribution.
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Where µEMPIi , σEMPIi  is the average and standard deviation of EMPI in the 
economy i respectively.
5　Estimation Methodology: Dynamic Probit Model
The study analyzes the determinants of currency crises to identify a set of lead-
ing indicators and develops a dynamic probit model that links the binary cur-
rency crisis index to the set explanatory variables.
The probit approach of studying currency crises is not new, but the methodol-
ogy applied here that is different from previous empirical studies treats currency 
crises as a dynamic events. Why should they be treated like that? The reason is if 
the countries did experience currency crisis that leads them behave differently 
from other countries where have no such experience. In this situation, there may 
be something changed in its economy or some new constrains are set up that is 
often called as true state dependence. In order to capture this effect, a lagged 
dependent variable is added in the probit model.
Specifically, the following equation used to estimate the effects of the eco-
nomic fundamentals, nancial and other variables5) on the probability of currency 
crises.
                                 y yit it it i it
*
= + + +
−
γ β α ε1 x  (1)
                　　                　　　　　　( i N t T= =1 2,..., ; ,..., )
Where yit
*  is the latent variable to measure the probability of an occurrence of 
currency crises in economy i at the time t. xit is a vector of the observation of 
 5)　More details see section 3.
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variables of economy i at the time t to explain the determinant of currency crises. 
β  is a vector of corresponding estimated coefficients, and γ  is expression of 
state dependence. εit  is error term to the currency crises index. Furthermore, 
assuming that ε  is serially independent of x  and generated by random from 
N( , )0 2σε  , individual specic time invariant α i  terms.
The individual specific random effects (RE) specification adopted implies 
equicorrelation between the vit  in any two different periods.
                                   
λ σ
σ σ
α
α ε
= =
+
corr v vit is( , )
2
2 2
                                                                       ( t s T, ,...,= ≠2  ; t s )
The standard uncorrelated RE model also assumes α i  independent identically 
distributed with N( , )0 2σα  with xit .
For yit
*  is not observable, the following yit (observed) which is called index 
function of currency crisis events in economy i at time t, takes on the value one if 
the event occurs and zero otherwise.
                                         
y
f y
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it
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=
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*
The paper also takes into account the fact that countries＇ differences may be 
correlated over time. If the structure of the errors are not treated properly may 
cause a conditional relationship between future and past experience that is termed 
spurious state dependence.6) In order to avoid this problem, assuming that the 
error term εit  in the structure is autocorrelated. The estimation of the dynamic 
probit model requires T-dimensional integrals of normal densities. Here applies 
the maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) estimator that developed by Gourie＇
 6)　See more details at Hyslop (1999).
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roux and Monfont (1996), and Cameron and Trivedi (2005) based on the 
Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) algorithm (Keane 1994). The εit  follows a 
first-order autogressive (AR1) process. The variance-covariance matrix, Ω , of 
v v vi i iT= ( ,..., )’1 , will now be function of λ, θ, and one more parameter. The error 
vector can be written as v Ci i= η , with ηi N I ( , )0  and C the lower triangular 
Cholesky decomposition of Ω (CC ’= Ω ).
Using the Cholesky decomposition, (1) can be written as
                                   
y y cit it it tj ij
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= + +
−
=
∑γ β η1
1
x
 (2)
                                                                      ( t ≥ 2 )
                                             yit i i
*
= +z 1pi η (3)
                                                                               ( t = 1;  i=1,...,N )
Where zi1  is a vector of exogenous instruments (and includes xi1 ) and ηi  is 
correlated with α i , but uncorrelated with εit for t ≥ 2 .
7)
From (2) and (3) and the assumption given, the probability for observed y can 
be derived from
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For a sequence of length T, this probability will be the product of T such terms.
 7)　See more details at Heckman (1981).
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6　Conclusion
The study gives the framework to analyze the currency crisis by employing a 
dynamic probit model with the set of leading indicators. The eminent of the 
approach is able to exploit the full information of dataset, along both cross coun-
try and time dimension. It also provides a comprehensive discussion of some 
denitions and measurements of currency crises to make it comparable with oth-
ers.
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